The SEC's proposed Order Competition Rule aims to increase competition in the market for retail investor orders. Currently, wholesalers can buy order flow from retail brokers and provide a fill within the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) without exposing the order to open market competition. The proposed rule would allow marketable retail orders to be segmented on exchanges just as wholesalers currently do. Moreover, it “forces” retail brokers/wholesalers to expose these orders to competitive auctions where institutional investors and other market participants will be able to interact with and provide price improvement over the NBBO in return for lower adverse selection costs (or access to liquidity). In this paper, we provide a summary of the proposed changes, analysis of the impact on retail and institutional investors, and our interpretative commentary and suggestions in the sections below.
Some execution algorithm providers approach the design of futures algorithms by starting with an equity algo base and editing the details to tailor to the specificities of trading futures. While this approach may create a fair foundation, on average, it leads to unnecessarily high trading costs—sometimes in extreme fashion—because futures come with their own unique market structure and market microstructure challenges. In this paper, we introduce five of the biggest challenges associated with futures execution and how they can impact execution costs, including volume prediction, navigating long queues for passive execution, handling widely varied volatility profiles, exchange matching rules, and 24-hour trading.
Single dealer platforms (SDPs) are alternative sources of liquidity for US equity execution algorithms, and the negative consequences of using them are not well understood. In this paper, we review the implications of taking liquidity from an SDP as opposed to an exchange or ATS and explain what traders can do about them. We also dispel some of the common marketing misconceptions we most often hear about using SDPs, including that reacting to IOIs eliminates information leakage, that markout analysis shows there's no impact of trading with SDPs on performance, and that brokers' segmentation of order flow has no additional impact on performance.
This is only paper in the PFOF discussion to quantify its impact on transaction costs for institutional investors. In it, we address how wholesaling is different from market making on exchanges, how much price improvement retail investors really get by routing orders to wholesalers and how it compares to price improvement on exchanges, how much the bid-offer spread would narrow if retail order flow moved to exchanges, and how information asymmetry between wholesalers and exchange market makers affects bid-offer spreads.
For optimal routing of passive limit orders, one must determine which of the sixteen exchanges is most likely to yield a speedy fill. In this paper, we introduce two methods for dynamically identifying the most likely destination for marketable orders for strategic limit order routing. The results are intuitive in some respects, but surprising in others; exchange rankings are not in order of market share or access fees. Our findings show that those who understand brokers’ routing preferences can jump the queue ahead of your passive limit orders. Smart investors can reverse this disadvantage and improve their passive fill rates.
This research paper highlights the partial recovery of metrics contributing to execution cost during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. Metrics include volume, spread, depth, and market impact, both on average and intraday.
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